

The Morning Astorian.

VOL. LVII.

ASTORIA, OREGON, TUESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1904.

NO. 78.

PRESIDENT TELLS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH PANAMA

Says We Did Not Incite the People of the Isthmus to Rebellion Against Colombia.

Our Duty in Securing Canal Was Plain, as Was Effort of Colombia to Hold Us Up for an Enormous Sum for Necessary Concession.

Washington, Jan. 4.—The senate's first session was devoted entirely to Panama. President Roosevelt sent a message on the subject which was received with great interest. The discussion continued throughout the day, speeches being made both in defense and against the policy which had been pursued. McComas defended the president and asserted his action will stand if tried in court.

Stewart, of Nevada, severely criticized the Bogota government for its selfish action in preventing the construction of the canal.

Morgan, of Alabama, stated his preference for the Nicaragua route, and maintained that the present course of the administration was breaking down the established policy of the United States regarding neutrality.

Rev. Edward Hale, the new chaplain of the senate, clad in flowing black silk clerical robes, occupied the chair of the presiding officer just preceding the session, and on the body being called to order, offered a stirring invocation.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

Full Reply to Those Who Have Criticized Our Policy.

President Roosevelt lays before congress a statement of his action up to the present time of the act approved June 28, 1902, by which the president was authorized to secure "for the United States the property of the Panama Canal Company and the perpetual control of a strip six miles wide across the Isthmus of Panama." It was further provided that, "should the president be unable to obtain for the United States a satisfactory title to the prop-

erty of the new Panama Canal Company and the control of the necessary territory of the republic of Colombia within reasonable time and upon reasonable terms," then the president should endeavor to provide for a canal by the Nicaragua route.

The president says that when this government submitted to Colombia the Hay-Herran treaty three things were already settled. One was that the canal should be built; the second, that it should be "our purpose to deal not merely in a spirit of justice, but in a spirit of generosity with the people through whose land we might build it. The Hay-Herran treaty says the president, "if it erred at all, erred in the direction of over generosity toward the Colombia government. In our anxiety to be fair we had gone to the verge in yielding to a weak nation's demand what that nation was helplessly unable to enforce from us against our will. The only criticism made upon the administration for the terms of the Hay-Herran treaty was for having granted too much to Colombia, not for failure to grant enough. Neither in the congress nor in the public press, at the time this treaty was formulated, was there complaint that it did not in the fullest and amplest manner guarantee to Colombia everything that she could by any color of title demand.

"Nor is the fact to be lost sight of that the rejected treaty, while generously responding to the pecuniary demands of Colombia, in other respects merely provided for the construction of the canal in conformity with the express requirement of the act of congress on June 28, 1902."

Continuing, the president says:

"The treaty, instead of requiring a cession of Colombia's sovereignty over the canal strip, expressly acknowledged, confirmed and preserved her sovereignty over it. The treaty in this respect simply proceeded on the lines on which all negotiations leading up to the present situation have been conducted.

"During the years of negotiations and discussion that preceded the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never intimated that the requirement by the United States of control over the canal strip would render unattainable the construction of a canal by way of the Isthmus of Panama; nor were we advised, during the months when legislation of 1902 was pending before the congress, that the terms which it embodied would render negotiations with Colombia impracticable. It is plain that no nation could construct and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a less degree of control than was stipulated for on the Hay-Herran treaty. A refusal to grant such degree of control was necessarily a refusal to make any practicable treaty at all.

"That the canal itself was eagerly demanded by the people of the locality through which it was to pass, and that the people of this locality no less eagerly for its construction under American control, are shown by the unanimity of the action in the new Panama republic. Furthermore, Colombia, after having rejected the treaty in spite of our protests and warnings when it was in her power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty if only the status quo could be restored. One of the men standing highest in the official circles of Colombia, on November 5, addressed the American minister at Bogota, saying that if the government of the United States would land troops to preserve Colombia's sovereignty and the transit the Colombian government would declare martial law; and by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, would approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the government of the United States would call extra session of the congress with new and friendly members next May to approve the treaty.

"Third—Finally the congress definitely settled where the canal was to be built. It was provided that a treaty should be made for building the canal across the Isthmus of Panama; and if, after reasonable time, it proved impossible to secure such treaty, that then we should go to Nicaragua. The treaty has been made; for it needs no argument to show that the intent of the congress was to insure a canal across Panama."

The president relates the delay of the Colombian congress in taking action on the treaty and the breaking out of the revolution three days after that body ended its session in October without passing upon the document.

"Panama," he says, "became an independent state and the control of the territory necessary for building the canal then became obtainable. The condition under which alone we could have gone to Nicaragua thereby became impossible of fulfillment. If the pending treaty with Panama should not be ratified by the senate, this would not alter the fact that we could not go to Nicaragua. The congress has decided the route and there is no alternative under existing legislation."

The president says that Secretary Hay had repeatedly warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow from her rejection of the treaty, and, although the administration had special means of knowledge, no such means were necessary in order to appreciate the possibility of a revolutionary outbreak.

"Quotations from the daily papers," says he, "could be indefinitely multiplied to show this state of affairs," and the president quotes dispatches sent by special correspondents to Washington and New York papers under dates extending over a period from August 31 to October 25, telling of the stirred condition of affairs.

The president had also, on October 15, at the request of Lieutenant-General Young, seen Captain H. B.

Humphrey and Lieutenant Grayson Mallet-Provost Murphy, who had just returned from a four months' tour through portions of Venezuela and Colombia. They had informed him that it was the general belief that the revolution might break out at any moment. "In view of all these facts," says the president, "I directed the navy department to issue instructions such as would insure your having ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of need arising."

Then on November 2, when it was evident the outbreak was imminent, instructions had been sent to the commanders of the Boston, Nashville and Dixie, "to maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama."

On November 2, Commander John Hubbard of the Nashville, had reported to the navy department that 400 Colombian troops from Cartagena had landed in Colon and that the situation was most critical. The president then quotes from Commander Hubbard's report on November 5 to the navy department, in which the commander said the occurrences of November 3 had "amounted to practically the making of war against the United States by the officers in command of the Colombian troops in Colon."

The United States consul had received notice from Colonel Torres to the effect that if the Colombian officers Generals Tobal and Amaya, who had been seized in Panama on November 3 by the independents, were not released by 2 o'clock he, Torres, "would open fire on the town of Colon and kill every United States citizen in the place. Commander Hubbard then relates the landing of the marines under command of Lieutenant-Commander Witzel, as told in the press dispatches at the time, and the threatening attitude of the native soldiers while the United States marines were entrenched in the railroad company's sheds, where our citizens had taken refuge. Commander Hubbard told also of refusing to allow Superintendent Shaler, of the Panama railroad, to transport troops for either side. The president continues:

"This plain official account of the occurrences of November 4 shows that instead of there having been too much provision by the American government for the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of the American warships had been too long delayed; so long, in fact, that there were but 42 marines and sailors available to land and protect the lives of American men and women. It was only the coolness and the gallantry with which this little band of men wearing the American uniform faced 10 times their number of armed foes, bent on carrying out the atrocious threat of the Colombia commander, that prevented the murderous catastrophe. At Panama, when the revolution broke out, there was no American man of war and no American troops or sailors. At Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with entire impartiality toward both sides, preventing any movement whether by the Colombians or the Panamans which would tend to produce bloodshed."

The president then quotes from an article in the New York Evening Post, under date of Panama, December 3, in which in an interview a native Panamanian is quoted as saying:

"We were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at Colon and fight it out, but the commander of the United States cruiser Nashville, forbidding Superintendent Shaler to allow the railroad to transport troops for either party."

"It clearly appears," says the president, "that the fact that there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was directly due—and only due—to the prompt and firm enforcement by the United States of its traditional policy. During the past 40 years revolutions and attempts at revolution have succeeded one another with monotonous regularity on the Isthmus, and again and again United States sailors and marines have been landed as they were landed in this instance and under similar instructions to protect the transit. One of these revolutions resulted in three years of warfare; and the aggregate of bloodshed and misery caused by them has been incalculable. The fact that in this last revolution not a life

REPLY OF RUSSIA IS IN HANDS OF ALEXIEFF TO BE DELIVERED TO JAPAN

As to Acceptance None Will Express an Opinion, but From Russia's Point of View Japan Can Avoid War.

Situation Does Not Alter And Preparations for Hostilities Continue by Little Brown Men—Steam Coal Ordered From Wales—Fall of Securities on Bourse Cause the Undoing of Many Brokers Interested.

Paris, Jan. 4.—The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Herald says the reply of the Russian government to the Japanese government is now in the hands of Admiral Alexieff, who will deliver it when he considers the fitting moment has arrived.

The correspondent adds: "As to whether Russia's reply will be acceptable to Japan, no one here will express an opinion. From Russia's point of view it is framed in a manner which Japan can honorably accept."

London, Jan. 4.—Special cablegrams from Tokio printed in this morning's newspapers have nothing new to report concerning the situation beyond a heavy fall in all securities on the bourse as a result of which several brokers have been ruined.

Cardiff, Wales, Jan. 4.—It is reported on the coal exchange today that Japan is placing orders here for 80,000 tons of steam coal, conditioned on a shipment during January. Forty thousand tons of steam coal have already been bought by Japan from the Wales' mines.

Maita, Jan. 4.—Five Russian torpedo boat destroyers sailed from here today in an eastward direction.

PRAYS THAT WAR MAY BE AVERTED IN ORIENT.

Chaplain in House Offers up fervent invocation—Sharp Debate Over Privilege Resolution.

Washington, Jan. 4.—With the reassembling of congress today the chaplain of the house in the opening session of that body prayed that war be

averted.

A privileged resolution offered by Mr. Hay, democrat, recited that certain statements contained in the Bristow postoffice report, reflected upon the membership of the house. It provided for an investigation by a committee to be appointed by the speaker. A point of order made against the resolution by Gardner was overruled and the same fate met Payne, (republican, N. Y.) who desired to refer the resolution to the postoffice committee. A vote on ordering the previous question resulted in a tie, the minority supporting Mr. Hay. The vote developed no quorum, and the house adjourned.

MINISTER DRAWS LESSON.

New York, Jan. 4.—In a sermon built upon the lesson taught by the Chicago theater fire, Dr. George C. Lorimer, of the Madison avenue Baptist church, said: while we are investigating the cause of the Chicago disaster, it would be well to enlarge our inquiries and see to it that life is not in other places unnecessarily imperiled.

"This catastrophe also raises the question whether the whole business of amusement is not greatly overdone. Time was when theaters were open in the evening only, then came the week end afternoon performance, but now there are some shows that run wide open from morning until late at night, as though theater going was the supreme end of life. Sunday is also encroached upon, particularly in Chicago. And, apart from the peril of life there is this question confronting parents, whether it is advisable to develop this taste for theater going in such young children as perished in the Chicago fire."

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SALE COMMENCES

Monday, January 4, 1904.

P. A. STOKES

(Continued on page four.)